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Theory is the dominant method for the presentation of knowledge within public law.  
Theories may be criticised, altered and developed yet little consideration is given as to 
why theory is employed in the way that it is, how theory may impact on the analysis 
concerned or even whether alternative approaches may be more effective.  Accordingly, 
this paper seeks to address these questions by focusing on a key area within public law 
analysis, that of the notion of sovereignty.   
 
The notion of sovereignty has been selected as the focus of investigation because it is an 
area of recent debate and it is preferable to focus on a single notion in order to identify 
the diversity of theoretical approaches and issues that a single notion can raise.  
Accordingly, the paper falls into a number of sections.  Initially the notion of sovereignty 
will be considered in terms of theory and will draw upon the work of three particular 
public lawyers, Wade1, Allan2 and MacCormick.3  The notion of sovereignty will then be 
evaluated as a concept.  Here the writers Walker4 and Loughlin5 will be examined.  The 
paper will then attempt to identify an alternative approach to the presentation of the 
notion of sovereignty.  Theory and concepts will be used as evaluative tools but the 
manner of their deployment will be reassessed in the light of the earlier findings.  The 
paper will conclude by offering a number of observations on the use and application of 
theory and concepts in relation to the notion of sovereignty in particular and the 
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PUBLIC LAW AND THEORY 
 
Within the realm of public law theory has always been the dominant method for 
identifying and attributing meaning to phenomena.  It is used as a means of representing 
certain undertakings which are perceived to be particular, or ‘internal’, to public law.6  
Theory is also used to interpret events which have been viewed as changing the nature of 
public law, such as regulatory theory7 or the theory of juridification.8  In addition to this 
contextual development and deployment of theory, public law also draws upon theories 
which, it could be argued, are ‘external’ to its analysis.  Such theories may be viewed as 
being legal in nature although the origin of these theories may not lie within public law 
analysis per se.9  Even theories which can be viewed as being ‘external’ to legal analysis, 
in that they originate from a non-legal discipline, have been used.10  Public law also 
incorporates theories developed by individuals, both lawyerly11 and non-lawyerly in their 
origins.12  Given this strong and diverse tradition it is not surprising that sovereignty is a 
notion which has been the subject of much theoretical examination.  Accordingly, it is 
proposed to examine how theory has been used to present the notion of sovereignty. 
 
THE NOTION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THEORY 
 
In respect of the notion of sovereignty it is possible to identify a number of ways in 
which theory is used as method of explanation. 
 
a.  Sovereignty as a theoretical phenomenon 
 
The classic presentation of sovereignty is as a particular theoretical phenomenon.  This 
approach can be found in the work of Wade.13  Wade argued that that there could be no 
substantive limits placed on the legislative powers of Parliament and that ultimately the 
only real limitation was that Parliament could not detract from its own sovereignty. 
 
In constructing a theory of sovereignty Wade draws on three sources: firstly, the works of 
earlier constitutional writers, such as, Coke,14 Blackstone15 and most notably Dicey.16  
                                                 
6   Such as the rule of law or the separation of powers. 
7   See J. Kay, C. Mayer and D. Thompson (eds.) Privitisation and Regulation-the UK Experience (1986) 
8   See M. Loughlin 'Law, Ideologies and the Political-Administrative System', (1989) Journal of Law and 
Society, Vol. 16, page 21; Legality and Locality: The Role of Law in Central-Local Government (1996); 
'The Restructuring of Central-Local Relations' in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), The Changing 
Constitution (4th ed, 2000), 137. 
9   Examples of such theories are those of legal positivism and natural law. 
10  Such as autopoiesis and functionalism. 
11  Such as Dworkin. 
12  Such as Foucault and Habermas. 
13  See n 1 above (1955) 172. 
14  E. Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1628); The Second Part of the Institutes 
of the Law of England (1641); The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Law of England Concerning the 
Jurisdiction of the Courts (1644). 
15  W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book the First: The Rights of Persons (1765). 
16  A. V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (10th ed, 1960), 27. 
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These writers are part of a formalist tradition within public law17 where law is 
represented as being ‘strictly neutral’ and that the ‘purity of constitutional law’ depends 
on a strict separation of law from politics.18  Secondly, Wade also uses case law as a 
source.19  Again, this is a feature which can be found within the formalist tradition.  
Finally, Wade draws on legal jurisprudence.  Here Wade initially drew upon Salmond’s 
notion of the ‘ultimate legal principle’.20  Wade identified a common law “rule” 
concerning sovereignty that is distinguishable from all other rules of common law.21  The 
“rule” relating to sovereignty is an exception because it cannot be altered by statute and 
the source for the rule is historical rather than legal.  It is the ultimate rule of the system 
in that those who operate the legal system accept it as a ‘truism’ and the ‘ultimate 
political fact’.  Although Wade’s analysis was challenged by other constitutional 
writers,22 it was not until the passing of the European Communities Act 1972 and the 
decision R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd (No. 2)23 that 
Wade shifted his view.  Wade commented that whilst the House of Lords may ‘turn a 
blind eye to constitutional theory’ and that the decision may be ‘unsatisfying to the 
academic mind, it at least provides a further example of the constitution bending before 
the winds of change, as in the last resort it will always succeed in doing.’24  For Wade the 
change represented a ‘technical revolution’ which is inevitable when ‘political necessity’ 
causes ‘judges, faced with a novel situation, elect to depart from familiar rules’.25  Since 
one of one of Wade’s three methodological features was excluded by the judiciary, 
namely that of constitutional theory, Wade had to accommodate any change to the theory 
by drawing upon the remaining two.  Initially, case law26 was deployed, albeit from a 
non-UK source, but ultimately legal jurisprudence was used.  Jurisprudentially, Wade 
justifies the change by deploying Harts analysis on the ‘rule of recognition’.27  Hart, in a 
debate on sovereignty, had argued that the ‘ultimate rule of recognition’ cannot be 
validated by any other legal rule or norm but exists through the ‘complex and normally 
concordant practice’ of judges.  Accordingly, Wade is able to detect that the ‘new’ rule of 
recognition possesses an authority which was absent in the old rule of recognitions - a 
change which the judges were able to recognise.28  It is interesting that Wade uses legal 
jurisprudence as the most forceful support for the shift in position given that the other 
features within the original theory, those of constitutional theory and case law, had been 
the strongest.  This may be partly explained by the fact that the work of the constitutional 
                                                 
17  See M. Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (1992). 
18  See n 1 above (1980) at pages 1–2. 
19  Vauxhall Street Estates Ltd v Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 KB 733; Ellen Street Estates Ltd v 
Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590; British Coal Corporation v The King [1935] AC 500. 
20  Sir J. Salmond, Jurisprudence (1947) 155. 
21  See n 1 above (1955) at 187-189. 
22  Such as Sir I. Jennings The Law of the Constitution (1967), R. F. V. Heuston Essays in Constitutional 
Law (1964) and G. Marshall Constitutional Theory (1971).  Generally see P. Craig ‘Parliamentary 
Sovereignty of the United Kingdom After Factortame’ (1991) 11 Year Book of European Law 221.  
23  [1991] AC 603. 
24  See n 1 above (1996) 568 at 575. 
25  ibid at 574. 
26  Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952(2) S.A. 428; [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1245, discussed in (1955) 
Cambridge Law Journal 172. 
27  H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law (2nd ed. 1994).  
28  See n 1 above (1996) 568 at 574. 
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theorists and the use of case law drew on the formalist tradition, whilst Wade’s use of 
legal jurisprudence was innovative and possibly gave increased weight to the theory at 
the time. 
 
Ultimately, it can be argued that Wade’s analysis represents sovereignty not just as a 
theoretical explanation of a particular phenomenon but also as an observational term, that 
is, something which is.  Furthermore, the theory and the observation are unified, in that 
when Wade writes of sovereignty it is synonymous with Parliament, Parliament’s 
capacity to create law and the fact that Parliament does create law.  However, this 
convergence of theory and observation works as long as there is no change.  When one of 
the features of the theory is challenged through the passing of entrenching legislation, 
such as the European Communities Act 1972, then a problem occurs.  Since it is the 
observation which causes the divergence, it is the construction of the theory which 
becomes the focus of concern.  Wade reconciles the difference between the theory and 
the observation is by asserting that there has been a failure on the part of the judiciary to 
recognise a particular observation within the original ‘rule of recognition’.  This 
unobserved observational information helps to preserve the integrity of the theory.  If 
however, the unobserved information had been represented as ‘bad history’, that is a flaw 
within the observation; this would have cast doubt on the validity of the analysis.  
Ironically, underpinning the entire analysis is yet another theory, the separation of 
powers.  The separation of powers provides an explanation as to the structure, institutions 
and functions within which Wade’s analysis occurs and makes the analysis both plausible 
and confirmable.   
 
It could be argued that, to present the notion of sovereignty as a theory is a useful method 
for the explanation of observations as they function within a structure.  However, there 
are a number of inadequacies that need to be acknowledged, such as the requirement of 
another theory in order to achieve a full explanation along with the difficulty in 
accommodating new information, in that change can only occur within the parameters or 
observations of the theory.  Change which takes place outside or beyond those parameters 
can never be included because it will ultimately be beyond observation and, if it is 
included, then the representation which the theory explains will cease to exist.  At the 
same time sovereignty, as theory, can also be used to exclude certain types of 
information, such as the political.  Ultimately, presenting sovereignty as a theory is not a 
very powerful method for proving the existence of the phenomenon. 
 
b.  Sovereignty, theory and realism 
 
An example of where theory is used to construct a view of sovereignty which is ‘realistic’ 
can be found in the work of Allan.  In contrast to Wade, Allan argues that legal 
sovereignty possesses a component of political morality29 and in order to include such an 
element, Allan uses theory, in particular the work of Dworkin. 
 
                                                 
29  See n 2 above (1993) 282-286. 
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Dworkin is doubtful about the idea of a legal theory that views what matters as a valid 
proposition of law can only be determined by reference to its ‘pedigree’.30  Instead, 
Dworkin argues that in ‘hard cases’ where relevant legal rules are ambiguous, vague, 
inconsistent or just absent and consequently do not provide a clear answer to a legal 
dispute, then judges will look ‘behind the rules’ to the principles that underlie and justify 
them.  For Dworkin, the law includes not just rules, but also underlying principles and 
beyond these, more abstract principles, all of which fit together into a coherent whole.31  
If, it is then found that a particular rule or principle is incompatible with these deeper 
principles then it must be rejected as a mistake.  Dworkin argues that judges do this when 
they overrule common law doctrines which have been laid down in earlier cases.  In these 
situations judges are not radically changing the law but merely correcting an error in the 
application of the deeper principle.32   
 
Allan argues that Dworkin’s theory can be applied to fundamental constitutional rules, 
including Hart’s ‘rule of recognition’.33  For Allan, ‘the fundamental rule that accords 
legal validity to Acts of Parliament is not itself the foundation of legal order beyond 
which the lawyer is forbidden to look.’34  Instead, Parliamentary authority ultimately 
derives from deeper principles that are indistinguishable from the deepest principles 
within the common law.  Furthermore, argues Allan, ‘the sovereignty doctrine must be 
understood in the light of a moral or political theory of the polity’,35 such as democracy, 
the rule of law and equal citizenship.36  Accordingly, constitutional rules, including 
parliamentary sovereignty, must be repudiated if they are inconsistent with those deeper 
principles.37 
 
It is suggested that Allan’s use of theory to construct a theory of sovereignty which is 
realistic raises a number of questions.  Firstly, whilst there are merits to Dworkin’s 
analysis as an explanation of the common law, it has been questioned as to whether 
Dworkin’s theory of the common law is applicable in a constitutional context.38  
Dworkin presents his theory as an ‘interpretation’ of how judges decide cases in a 
common law system and claims that his theory can be confirmed from the way judges act 
and speak as is they are guided by principles.39  But, argues Goldsworthy, whilst the facts 
do not have to be altered to fit Dworkin’s theory, its application to cases of a 
constitutional nature is not so apparent.40  In such instances judges seldom talk of 
applying ‘political’ or’ moral’ principles and where such issues do arise, judges may 
ecifically defer to Parliament.   
                                                
sp
 
30  R. Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977) chapter 2. 
31  Ibid at chapters 2 -4. 
32  See J. Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (1999) at page 247. 
33  See n 2 above (1997) 443 at 444. 
34  See n 2 above (1993) at 265-6. 
35  See n 2 above (1993) at page 280 drawing on n 30 above (1977) Chapter 4 and R. Dworkin Laws 
Empire (1986). 
36  See n 2 above (1997) 443 at 445. 
37  See n 2 above (1993) at page 146 and (1997)443 at 445. 
38  See R. Dworkin Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (1996) chapter 10 
39  See n 30 above (1977) Chapter 4, esp. 86-7, 112, 115-116.  See also n 35 above (1986) Chapters 1, 3 and 
7. 
40  See n 32 above. 
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Secondly, Allan’s realism is based on objective facts, which can be identified as the 
outcomes of judicial decision making in the context of constitutional law.  If these 
objective facts match the outcome of judicial decision making, in the context of the 
common law, then there must be realism.  How this convergence comes about does not 
matter, it is only the fact that there is a convergence which is relevant.  Furthermore, 
given the diversity of contexts within which these areas of law operate, then there must 
exist some deep principles which facilitates the convergence.  Accordingly, to argue that 
Allan’s analysis is inaccurate would be preposterous since it would suggest that the 
convergence of common law and constitutional law was either impossible, which it is not 
since it occurs, or that the convergence is random.  Observations indicate otherwise, and 
these observations are facts.  Accordingly, it cannot be co-incidence, but must represent 
ality and ultimately accuracy since the convergence did occur.   
 of sovereignty reveals as much about the 
ature of liberal democracy within the UK.   
.  Sovereignty and the unification of theory 
                                                
re
 
The problem with the realist approach is that it does contain an element of reflexivity.41  
For example, if judges make decisions based on deep principles, then the deep principles 
will then be communicated to others who represent these principles as reality, yet the 
system within which the principles operate and the existence of the principles per se, may 
not converge.  So in the short term there is idealism instead of reality, but with the 
potential for reality in the future as the process of communication continues and expands.  
In some respects theory as realism is static in that it is passive and may possesses weight 
but is ultimately unmoving in terms of the development of any analysis.  There is also a 
requirement to go beyond the empirical content of the theory to a belief in the theory 
itself.  It is acceptability of the theory itself which then provides the belief in the 
phenomenon that the theory attempts to explain.  Accordingly, if the theory is not 
believed, then the phenomenon does not exist.  Furthermore, knowledge of the theory, 
reveals more about the nature of things beyond that with which the theory is concerned.  





The unification of theory in order to present a theory of sovereignty can be found in the 
work of MacCormick.42  MacCormick argues that law is an institutional system of rules 
and norms and in every system there will exist some way for determining what are the 
authoritative norms.  In that way each system will posses a self-referential quality.  
Traditionally, these institutional systems have been perceived as being territorially 
concentrated in the form of a state and there has a tendency to equate the state with law.  
MacCormick describes this interrelation of coercive power with the normative order as 
‘state-law’ but argues that such a perception has the effect of distorting legal theory, 
particularly in reference to sources of authority.  Where a state has law which regulates 
citizens and political activates, then there is s system of ‘Law-State’, or Rechtstaat.  A 
‘well ordered Law-State or Rechtstaat is not subordinate to any political sovereign 
 
41  Generally see G. Teubner Law as an Autopoietic System (1993); N. Luhman ‘Law as a Social System’ 
Northwestern University Law Review (1989) 136. 
42  See n 3 above. 
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outside or above the law’ and this shows ‘that sovereignty is neither necessary to the 
existence of law and state nor even desirable’.43  Hence, MacCormick’s conclusion, that 
there has been a movement ‘beyond sovereign state’44 to the ‘the era of post-
vereignty’.45 
ereignty operates in a particular way, then it is because of the 
nderlying norms.   
                                                
so
 
Unification, as a method for the presentation of the notion of sovereignty within 
MacCormick’s analysis occurs at two levels: firstly, in respect of theory and secondly, on 
respect of the notion of sovereignty.  In respect of theory, the basis of MacCormick’s 
analysis is the ‘institutional theory of law’46 which seeks to combine a ‘normativist 
conception of institutions with a particular form of legal positivism’.47  It is argued that 
institutions posses a normative core which provide the aims and values to be deployed in 
respect of their competency and behaviour.  These norms operate both internally and 
externally, but they are also organising and justificatory in nature.  They also represent a 
form of deliberation and control which occurs through social action and interaction with 
other institutions.  McCormick represents the institutional theory of law as a means of 
‘unifying’ positivism with Dworkin.  As MacCormick states, the institutional theory of 
law recognises the ‘explicite and the implicite legal ideal connections between the norms 
of the legal system, i.e. with legal principles, the teleological background of the law and 
with policies in the sense of Dworkin’.48  In respect of the notion of sovereignty there is a 
unification of the diverse perceptions of sovereignty.  There are the linear perceptions of 
sovereignty as legal and political, or sovereignty as internal and external, but also 
hierarchical perceptions as sovereignty operating at various territorial levels of regions, 
states, Europe and the international.  The unification of this diversity occurs through the 
operation of norms, that is, sovereignty as a form of ‘political morality’49 which provides 
a form of limitation on the operation of power.  MacCormick’s analysis does offer 
explanation and increased understanding of the notion of sovereignty in that it 
demonstrates a multitude of varieties of sovereignty, except that all these variations 
operate on the basis of a single, shared feature, that of institutional norms.  In other 




There are, however, some problems with using theory to unify diverse explanations of 
particular phenomena in that whilst it may provide some understanding of a notion, such 
as sovereignty, in terms of why it operates in a particular manner, it does not explain 
 
43  Ibid (1999) at page 129. 
44  Ibid (1999) at page 133 and N. MacCormick ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) Modern Law Review 
1. 
45  Ibid (1999) Chapter 8. 
46  Also known as ‘institutional legal positivism’ or ‘new institutionalism’.  See D.N MacCormick and O. 
Weinberger An Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal Positivism (1986); O. Weinberger 
Law, Institutions and Legal Politics: Fundamental Problems of Legal Theory and Social Philosophy 
(1991). 
47  O. Weinberger Law, Institutions and Legal Politics: Fundamental Problems of Legal Theory and Social 
Philosophy (1991) at page 111. 
48  See n 46 above (1986) at page 113 (authors italics).  
49  See n 3 above (1999) at page 130. 
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how.  But then, given the wide range of parameters which are being unified does this 
matter?  There is also the presumption that the same values or norms will operate 
throughout the various features which are being unified.  However, should one dimension 
choose to adopt different norms or values, due to the occurrence of a crisis, then the 
notion of sovereignty descends into schisms, in other words, a dimension which exists 
eyond mere division.  
mething entirely 
ifferent, an alternative model of sovereignty, that of post-sovereignty.   
.  Summary 
 particular phenomenon cannot be found to exist, then the 
eory may be abandoned.50   
                                                
b
 
Ultimately, the problem with using theory as unification is the method used to create 
unity.  This can be achieved either, by determining or displaying a degree of 
interconnectedness, or by way of reduction.  Whilst reduction can produce a rigid theory, 
interconnectedness allows for flexibility but the structure of the theory must be very 
broad in order to allow for the inclusion of an assortment of phenomenon.  In respect of 
MacCormick’s analysis interconnectedness is used.  However, it could be argued that, the 
various notions of sovereignty which are being connected within MacCormick’s analysis 





The above examination on sovereignty and the use of theory reveals that whilst Wade, 
Allan and MacCormick are examining the same phenomena, using different methods and 
approaches, the outcome of their analysis is quite diverse, almost unconnectable.  The 
statement may seem obvious, but it raises the question, is this diversity a consequence of 
differing approaches to the phenomenon under investigation or the nature of the 
phenomenon being evaluated?  In scientific analysis constant testing of a phenomenon is 
conducted in order to prove the existence and features of the phenomenon.  Furthermore, 
testing will be undertaken using different methods and conditions in order to verify its 
existence and features.  In other words, the focus of study is actually quite fixed, it is the 
methods for testing which will vary.  If diverse results are produced, then the reasons for 
the differences will be explored, methods revised and altered to accommodate the new 
findings but, if ultimately, the
th
 
In the context of public law analysis in relation to the notion of sovereignty, it has been 
shown that there is a history of differences being explored, revisionism and methods 
altered.  Whilst this may indicate the use of diverse approaches for the testing of the 
notion, the actual mechanism for testing is actually quite fixed - that of theory.  
Ironically, given the diversity of analysis surrounding the notion of sovereignty there has 
begun to emerge some discussion on abandoning the phenomenon.51  It is an argument 
which originated within modern political science52 and it is interesting to note that, 
within this discipline, the notion of sovereignty has also received mixed treatment.  
 
50  Consider for example, theories such as, the world is flat, the earth revolves around the sun and 
creationism. 
51  For a critical assessment of this argument see B Van Roermund in N. Walker (ed) Sovereignty in 
Transition (2003) at page 33.  
52  See S. I. Benn ‘The Uses of Sovereignty’ Political Studies , 3:2 1955, page 122. 
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Within political science there also occurred a proliferation of the senses in which the 
notion is used, for example, state sovereignty and national sovereignty53 although some 
of the senses have become ‘blurred’, for example, popular sovereignty, popular state 
sovereignty, shared sovereignty and divided sovereignty.54  The ‘abandonment thesis’ 
came about because of the perception that the notion of sovereignty had become too 
ambiguous, too nuanced and even ‘a barrier to analysis’.55  There are also arguments 
against abandonment and it has even been suggested that the notion of sovereignty does 
not receive sufficient attention because the focus of analysis has been conditioned by 
ther phenomena, such as the state56 or democracy.57   
s in respect of the element of 
istance between the meta-theory and the original theory. 
he current method used to present the notion and 
mploy an alternative, such as concepts. 
 
THE NATURE OF CONCEPTS 
                                                
o
 
The possibility of public lawyers abandoning the notion of sovereignty is an option but, it 
is also worth considering the various alternatives that are available.  One option is to 
search further and wider for theories that can be used to evaluate sovereignty.  This 
approach possesses merit as it represents a continuation of the form adopted by Allan and 
MacCormick.  The problem is, how far and how wide should the search be conducted for 
ultimately, if the theories employed are too remote then the outcome could lack strength 
as an explanation of the phenomenon of sovereignty.  There is also the danger that the 
focus of analysis will become the critique rather than the phenomenon under 
investigation.  A further alternative is to construct a higher, or meta-theory of 
sovereignty.  This approach also possesses merit given the tradition within public law for 
hierarchally constructed theories58.  But, there are problem
d
 
All these approaches presume that theory is the only, or best, mechanism for the 
presentation of knowledge.  Yet, when a phenomenon, such as sovereignty, produces 
such a wide range of theory it may be more appropriate to consider using a different 
mechanism for the presentation of knowledge.  In other words, rather than abandon the 
notion of sovereignty, why not abandon t
e
 
There are many explanations as to ‘what’ is a concept.59  A basic definition is that a 
concept is an abstract representation which attempts to use words to portray reality.60  
 
53  See E. H. Carr The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939 (1978); see also n 52 above 
54  See M. Newman Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union (1996). 
55  See C. Lord ‘Sovereign or Confused? The “Great Debate” about British Entry to the European 
Community Twenty years On’ (1992) Journal of Common Market Studies 30:4, (1992) page 420; P. 
Lynch ‘Sovereignty and the European Union: Eroded, Enhanced, fragmented’ in L. Brace and J. 
Hoffman (eds.) Reclaiming Sovereignty (1997) pp 43-44. 
56  See J. Bartelson A Genealogy of Sovereignty (1995). 
57  See D. Held Political Theory and the Modern State (1989). 
58  For example, the theory of constitutional pluralism.  See N. Walker ‘The Idea of Constitutional 
Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 371. 
59  Generally see M. Weitz Theories of Concepts (1988).  
60  Generally see W. B. Gallie ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ in M. Black (ed.) The Importance of 
Language (1962); P. Thagard Conceptual Revolutions (1992). 
 9
The terms concepts and theory are occasionally used interchangeably but as methods for 
the presentation of knowledge they are quite distinct, particularly in relation to the 
positioning of knowledge.  Consider the example of Rufus the Siamese cat.  If Siamese 
cat is a concept then there will exist certain pre-defined information which will be 
associated with the concept of a Siamese cat, such as, the fact that Rufus should have 
blue eyes.  If he does not have blue eyes, then he will be something other than a Siamese 
cat.  However, it is also possible for Siamese cat to exist as a hypothesis.  If Siamese cat 
is a hypothesis, then the theory which proves that Rufus is a Siamese cat will attempt to 
identify what the features of a Siamese cat are.  It may be thought that Siamese cats will 
have blue eyes, but it must first be established that blue eyes are a feature of Siamese 
cats, only then can it be concluded that Rufus is indeed a Siamese cat.  The feature of 
blue eyes cannot be assumed, it must be found.  In other words, the distinction between a 
concept and a theory lies with where knowledge is positioned.  For theory, knowledge is 
to be discovered, even if that knowledge is thought to exist, whilst for a concept 
nowledge already exists, it is pre-defined.   
  Accordingly, it is 
roposed to consider how sovereignty can be presented as a concept. 
 
THE PRESENTATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AS A CONCEPT 
t.  For example, both Walker and 
oughlin commence their analysis with a definition as: 
 
urce 
and vehicle of ultimate authority for the juridical order of that polity’.63 
 of the political, and as providing the foundational 
concept of the discipline of public law’.66   
                                                
k
 
This may give the impression the concepts are quite rigid and fixed but pre-defined 
knowledge can also be ‘open-textured’.  Consider again the blue eyes of Rufus the 
Siamese cat.  There are many shades of blue, eyes can be numerous shapes, some eyes 
cannot see colour whilst others may need the assistance of glasses.
p
 
The presentation of sovereignty as a concept within public law is quite recent and can be 
found in the work of Walker61 and Loughlin62.  Just as the analysis of sovereignty in 
terms of theory was found to contain certain features, features can also be found to exist 
in respect of sovereignty and its presentation as a concep
L
‘the discursive form in which a claim concerning the existence and character 
of a supreme ordering power for a particular polity is expressed, which 
supreme ordering power purports to establish and sustain the identity and 
status of the particular polity qua polity and to provide a continuing so
 
It is then claimed that implicit in this definition is ‘that sovereignty involves a ‘speech 
act’64 – a ‘claim to ordering power’.65  For Loughlin, sovereignty ‘is to be understood as 
a representation of the autonomy
 
61  See n 4 above. 
62  See n 5 above. 
63  See n 4 above at page 6 (authors italics). 
64  Ibid. 
65  Ibid. 
66  See n 5 above (2003a) at page 56. 
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Both writers also provide a context, or justification, for their definition.  Walker, for 
example, is dismissive of the arguments against the abandonment of sovereignty but 
concedes that sovereignty has been aggravated by numerous developments within public 
law, most notably membership of the European Union.  These developments have 
resulted in sovereignty moving from a Westphalian phase to a post-Westphalian phase.  
Part of these changes has entailed a change in the use of sovereignty as a form of meta-
language, traversing and linking the object-language of the domains of political science, 
law, international relations, etc.  Sovereignty’s use as a form of meta-language remains, 
‘a plausible mechanism to help make sense of the social world, as well as forming part of 
the discourse and self-understanding of social actors’67 but, the challenge is to 
reconceptualise sovereignty in the context of the European Union.  Walker argues that the 
‘basic conceptual apparatus of sovereignty can be adapted to understand the new order’.68  
A number of approaches have been attempted but the most viable is that of ‘constitutional 
pluralism’.69  Within this theoretical framework Walker then constructs a notion of ‘late-
sovereignty’ where the key features are those of continuity, distinctiveness, irreversibility 
and transformation.  Walker concludes that the task of ‘political and constitutional theory 
in conditions of late sovereignty is not to imagine, or to anticipate, a world in which new 
political values and virtues flourish in the absence of sovereignty, but to imagine and 
anticipate ways in which such values and virtues may flourish through the operation of 
sovereignty’.70  Further ‘sovereignty-dependent’ features are then identified as being a 
reflexive and publicly approbated constitutional discourse, a broad jurisdictional scope, 
interpretive autonomy, institutional depth and breadth, citizenship and representative 
mechanisms. 
 
Loughlin argues that the representation of sovereignty within public law has been fraught 
with difficulty.  The reasons for the difficulties range from the inability of commentators 
to recognise public law as a practice with its own distinctive methods and objectives, the 
attempts by political scientists and lawyers to ‘fix the concept of sovereignty within a 
formal, analytical and positivist frame’,71 or their attempt to ‘devise some transcendental 
principles of right conduct which legal and political behaviour must be subject’.72  In 
other words, Loughlin is critical of attempts to construct a notion of sovereignty within a 
defined theoretical framework, whatever the perspective, as sovereignty is 
‘quintessentially a political concept’.73  Loughlin then proceeds to identify ten tenets 
which present are ‘ideas that have been translated into concrete practices’ and represent 
‘the essence of the modern concept of sovereignty’.74  The tenets can be summarised as 
follows: sovereignty is a fact of the modern state and political relationships do not derive 
from property relationships.  Public powers differ from private power, is official in nature 
ands is the product of political relationships.  Sovereignty is an expression of public 
powers and it is relational in nature.  Rights are not antagonistic to sovereignty but a 
                                                 
67  See n 4 above at page 10. 
68  See n 4 above at page 19. 
69  See n 58 above. 
70  See n 4 above at page 31. 
71  See n 5 above (2003a) at page 56. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Ibid. 
74  Ibid. 
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product of the expression of sovereignty.  The system of public law is an expression of 
sovereignty and finally, public law is not solely a matter of positive law.    
 
Finally, it is suggested, that a key feature which underlies both Walkers and Loughlin’s 
analysis on sovereignty as a concept is the relationship of the concept to theory.  
Accordingly, in order to understand further how the notion of sovereignty can be 
represented as a concept, it is necessary to explore further this connection. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONCEPTS AND THEORY 
 
Both Walker and Loughlin contain within their definitions of sovereignty a premise that 
concepts are integral to theory.  Where they differ is in the nature of the relationship.  For 
Walker the relationship between the concept of sovereignty and theory is quite explicit.  
A concept of sovereignty is devised which, is not itself strictly theoretical but, is firmly 
placed within the context of theory, that of constitutional pluralism.  Constitutional 
pluralism is itself positioned within a further theory, that of legal pluralism.  The 
perception of sovereignty is that it ranks within a hierarchy of constructs.  Sovereignty, as 
a concept within this hierarchy of constructs, occupies a position which is subsidiary to 
that of theory but is ultimately part of theory.  In other words, it is theory which forms the 
basis for the presentation of knowledge and concepts are merely an explanatory tool 
within this mechanism.  This linking of the notion of sovereignty with the theories of 
constitutional pluralism, and ultimately legal pluralism, may be viewed as desirable in 
respect of the overall presentation of knowledge in the realm of public law.  However, by 
firmly entrenching the concept of sovereignty within theory, or theories, there are 
implications in terms of the representation of the notion of sovereignty.   
 
Firstly if, as identified above, for a concept to exist there must be some form of pre-
defined knowledge, then entrenching a concept within theory is not unacceptable.  There 
are, however, consequences attached to deploying concepts in such a manner.  In terms of 
Walker analysis it means, that ultimately, the true meaning of sovereignty can only be 
found within the wider context of the theory of constitutional pluralism and ultimately the 
theory of legal pluralism and not within the definition that Walker offers.  In other words, 
any analysis which includes Walker’s definition of sovereignty would be incomplete 
unless the wider parameters of the concept were both acknowledged and included.  This 
is not an immediate flaw but a potential flaw in respect of long term deployment of the 
concept of sovereignty. 
 
Secondly, the theory of constitutional pluralism is a ‘new’ theory developed to address 
perceived inadequacies within current constitutional analysis.75  However, by addressing 
the inadequacies within one area of analysis, it does not necessarily follow that the 
inadequacies identified within another will also be resolved.  Furthermore, any 
differences between the various areas of analysis could be made more acute if the areas 
are then ranked, not in terms of merit of investigation, but in terms of a hierarchy of 
mechanisms used to present the investigation.  In other words, not only should any 
                                                 
75  See n 58 above. 
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analysis which includes Walkers concept of sovereignty include an acknowledgement 
and explanation in terms of the theory in which the notion of sovereignty is entrenched, 
there should also be some acknowledgement and explanation concerning the choice of 
mechanism used to present the notion.  Whilst public lawyers do acknowledge the 
former, the latter is generally unrecognized.  
 
Yet, by entrenching sovereignty within a new theory, such as constitutional pluralism, 
this does offer the opportunity for the re-evaluation of established knowledge and/or the 
inclusion of new knowledge regarding the notion.  Consider, for example, the ‘political’ 
element excluded by Wade, but included by Allan, approved by MacCormick and now 
argued by Walker (and Loughlin) to be intrinsic to any analysis in respect of the notion of 
sovereignty.  However, it is suggested, that this assimilation of knowledge is not 
automatic even if a theory is specifically represented as possessing attributes which will 
allow for the inclusion of new material.76  The process for inclusion is incremental and 
dependent upon some sort of consensus concerning the weight to be accredited to the new 
material.  This explains the ‘history’ of the political element in relation to the legal 
presentation of the notion of sovereignty.  It also explains why some views are excluded, 
for example feminist analysis.  It is ironic that within the public law material used for this 
paper there is no discussion regarding feminist critiques on sovereignty, yet within 
political analysis, such discussions are well established.  Arguably, feminist critiques 
could be incorporated through existing new theory, such as the theory of constitutional 
pluralism, or even the development of further new theory but, the fact remains, for such 
an approach to be included it must first be invited in as it cannot enter freely.  Even once 
invited in, its future remains uncertain.   
 
Regarding Loughlin’s presentation on sovereignty as a concept, it can be argued that 
Loughlin widens the knowledge that sovereignty as a concept can represent, but a 
consequence of this widening, is that rather than particularizing the instances where the 
concept can be used, such as in the context of theory or even a particular theory, the 
concept becomes separated or set apart from theory.  The outcome is that Loughlin’s 
concept, albeit one that is interesting, is in reality a model – a framework used to present 
in isolation and in a systematic form in respect of a specific phenomenon in a specific 
situation.   
 
Accordingly, it is suggested that public law analysis on sovereignty as a concept 
possesses the same potential for conflict, confusion and inadequacy as the analysis on 
sovereignty and theory.  However, whilst such grounds were used to justify the 
abandonment of theory in respect of the notion of sovereignty, it is suggested that the use 
of concepts in respect of the notion of sovereignty merits further exploration.  The 
justification for this further investigation relates to the fact that, when contrasted with the 
use of theory within public law, the use of concepts as a primary mechanism for the 
presentation of knowledge is unexplored.  Accordingly, it is proposed to explore how the 
notion of sovereignty could be presented in terms of concepts.  
 
 
                                                 
76  Ibid. 
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THE NOTION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND CONCEPTS 
 
The use of concepts to present theory in respect of a notion, such as sovereignty, may 
appear to be improbable for a number of reasons.  Firstly, it could be argued that concepts 
must either be premised in theory or attached to theory.  Certainly, concepts cannot exist 
in isolation from theory because their nature (the requirement for predefined knowledge) 
entails a theoretical element.  However, does this feature necessitate that a concept must 
be tied to a single theory?  Could not a concept facilitate a connection between several 
theories, even when those which appear to be too diverse and possibly even incompatible 
or unconnectable?  
 
Secondly, whilst public lawyers are familiar with theory as a method of for the 
presentation of knowledge, they are unfamiliar with using concepts in this manner.  This 
argument is certainly true in relation to issues of a public law nature, but outside of public 
law, public lawyers do think in terms of concepts.  Consider the notion of the universe, or 
even that of a bird or a tree.  Just stating these terms will bring forth all sorts of 
information and understandings concerning the form and nature of these objects.  In other 
words, public lawyers are used to thinking about concepts, but not in the context of 
public law because they have been ‘trained’ to think otherwise, in terms of theory.  This 
‘training’, it is suggested can be and, should be challenged.   
 
Thirdly, it could be argued that only theory can be used to portray complex structures.  
This assertion stems from the limited role that concepts have been given within current 
public law analysis.  If concepts are used and portrayed as descriptive mechanisms, 
subsidiary to theory then they will always be perceived as being limited as methods for 
the presentation of theory.  However, consider again the notions of the universe, bird or 
tree.  Each of these notions gives rise to a complex structure of meaning.  The universe, 
for example consists of stars and planets.  Stars can be further subdivided into types 
attached to which planets can, or cannot, be found.  Planets form part of solar systems 
which are then classified as to types.  Within this system there will be a number of 
theories concerning the origin of the universe and its behaviour.  In other words, concepts 
can be used to create complex structures.  It can even be argued that a single concept can 
facilitate the inclusion of a much wider range of material than any single theory.  
Concepts, for example, can incorporate the depth of analysis as found within theory, but 
in contrast to theories, concepts can traverse across many theories at the same time 
without creating a hierarchy of knowledge.  Concepts can connect theories that on the 
face of it appear to be unconnectable, such as the analyses of Wade and Walker in the 
context of sovereignty.  This can be done by closing the field of application for the 
concept, i.e. the notion of sovereignty, but at the same time open up the concept to 
divergent interpretations. 
 
Finally, it could be argued that to depart from the established mechanism for the 
presentation of knowledge within public law could destroy the validity of any material 
which currently exists.  There is a risk that the material, norms and values contained 
within current theoretical analysis will become lost, undermined even overwhelmed.  
Given that the focus of this analysis has been the methods used for presentation and not 
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what sovereignty is, then any changes to the question of what is sovereignty will only 
become apparent when that particular question is addressed.  In such a study, material 
which is accurate should survive in spite of the conditions under which it is tested.   
 
The question then, which concepts could be used to evaluate the notion of sovereignty?  
The most obvious choice would be those concepts already found to exist within public 
law analysis, such as law, politics, state, democracy, citizenship, etc.  However, it is 
suggested that, in selecting these concepts there is a risk of transferring the existing 
predefined knowledge already attached to these concepts along with the incumbent 
problems found to relate to the theories within which these concepts were used.  
Furthermore, it could even be argued that some concepts actually represent a fallacy in 
the context of public law.  Consider for example, the concept of the state.  There has not 
evolved, in the context of the UK, an effective theory of the state, a facet which has been 
attributed to the existence of the Crown.77  Even the usage of the term ‘Crown’ is 
uncertain.  It has been used by the judiciary to refer to the Monarch personally, or to the 
executive itself78 and even to the government.79  In other words, the concept of the state 
may be applied to the executive, which performs many of the function of the state, yet in 
the context of sovereignty, it is parliament which is considered.  It is suggested that the 
dilemma has arisen because the executive has never been the focus of conflict, either 
political or historical.  Accordingly, public law has not been able to create a body of case 
law, or even draw upon a body of coherent statute law, in order to develop any 
understanding surrounding either the existence of the executive or its attributes.  Where 
case law and statute do exist in respect of the Executive the focus of lawyers has been 
that of limitation,80 whist in respect of Parliament the focus has been the absence of 
limitation, 81 a facet that lends itself to the notion of sovereignty.  
 
Accordingly, it is proposed to draw upon a number of concepts which will provide scope, 
simplicity, consistency and accuracy.  These concepts are ideology, structure and space.  
It is not proposed to present an in-depth presentation of sovereignty using these concepts, 
since it was not the aim of this study to consider the issue of what sovereignty is.  Instead, 
it is proposed to demonstrate how such an analysis might be undertaken through the use 
of a few key concepts.  Here the works of the various theorists will be considered along 
with how alternative approaches to the notion of sovereignty may also be included 
 
a.  Ideology 
 
No specific definition is offered in respect of the concept of ideology but, it is suggested 
that ideology can symbolize numerous things, such as legitimation, integration and 
socialization.82  In terms of the notion of sovereignty, the concept can be found to exist in 
                                                 
77  See K. Dyson The State Tradition in Western Europe (1980) at pages 37-42.  Also see T. Daintith and A. 
Page The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy and Internal Control (1999) Chapters 1 and 
2. 
78  M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377 at 395 per Lord Templeman. 
79  Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1978] AC 359 at 381 per Lord Diplock. 
80  The basis of judicial review. 
81  The basis of discussion on parliamentary sovereignty. 
82  Generally see M. Freeden Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (1998). 
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a number of forms.  In respect of Wade’s analysis, it could be argued, that the 
‘ideological’ does not exist because of the desire to separate the legal from the political, 
yet underpinning this separation lie certain values regarding the role of law and politics 
which could be regarded as being ideological in nature.  In contrast to Wade, the 
ideological component within Allan’s analysis is more apparent and is a direct 
consequence of drawing upon the work of Dworkin, whereas with MacCormick the link 
with the political is achieved through the institutional theory of law.  It is suggested that a 
common feature shared by the theorists as regards the concept of ideology is that of 
neutrality.  There is a distinction, however, in where this neutrality can be found.  Wade 
for example, neutrality lies in respect of the notion of law.  For Allan, neutrality stems 
from Dworkin’s arguments that political decisions occur independent from any 
conception of the good life or what gives value to life.83  With MacCormick, neutrality is 
represented through norms.  Each perception of neutrality represents a particular view of 
liberalism.  For Wade, the notion of sovereignty represents a form of liberalism where the 
state cannot impose any restrictions, not even upon its institutions; whereas Allan accepts 
that restrictions can be imposed as the meaning of the values used possess legitimacy 
whilst MacCormick espouses an form of nationalist liberalism where the potential 
excesses of nationalism are moderated through institutional frameworks, especially as 
these frameworks operate not just at a national level, but also a pan-national level through 
institutions such as the EU.  Central to all three perceptions of liberalism is the notion of 
the state, although this is manifested in terms of institutions because of the absence of a 
refined representation of the state within public law.84  For Wade, parliament is central 
and is seen to possess an authority and legitimacy above all other institutions within the 
state, whereas for Allan, it is the judiciary and for MacCormick, the executive.  Each 
draws upon a specific vision of a liberal democracy whereby communal need is 
expressed through a specific institution.  Both Loughlin and Walker attempt to move 
legal analysis beyond the statist perception of sovereignty which dominates Wade, Allan 
and MacCormick.  As a consequence, it could be argued that the ideological element is 
more apparent.  For Walker, the ideological occurs through ‘sovereignty dependent 
features’ such as citizenship and representation whereas Loughlin refers to features such 
as rights ands power.  However, would it not be more appropriate to unify these features 
through the concept of ideology rather than sovereignty, especially as it is sovereignty 
which is being explained?  The concept of ideology can then facilitate the explanation.  
 
Ideology could also be used to distinguish between different forms of power, not just the 
private and public power included defined by Loughlin but also feminist critiques along 
with Foucault’s85 argument that sovereignty is a medieval institution in which absolute 
control is exercised over subjects through an open and explicit display of violence.  In 
other words, going beyond positive law to include other theoretical approaches is much 
simpler to achieve through a concept, such as ideology, than by constructing a new 
theory.   
 
 
                                                 
83  R. Dworkin ‘Liberalism’ in A Matter of Principle (1986) at page 191.  
84  See above. 
85  See A. McHoul and W. Grace A Foucault Primer (1993) at pages 62-63. 
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b.  Structure 
 
A notional definition of structure is that it relates to framework, the various components 
within the framework, how these components relate to one another and how things, in 
general, are organized within the framework.  Structure, as a concept, can be found to 
exist within all the various theorists examined and can be found to assume three forms, 
although the level of consideration along with the context may vary. 
 
Firstly, structure can be seen to relate to the institutional arrangements of the UK 
constitution and ultimately the relationship with the EU.  It is suggested that such 
approach dominates the analysis of Wade, Allan and MacCormick, albeit in different 
levels and dimensions.  Secondly, the concept of structure also concerns the relationship 
which the differing forms of sovereignty seek to achieve, such as MacCormick’s ‘divided 
sovereignty’ or the relationship between law and politics focused upon by Allan and the 
use of Dworkin to achieve such a connection.  This approach can be contrasted with that 
of Loughlin, who whilst acknowledging the relationship between the legal and political 
also asserts that sovereignty must be distanced from a particular theory, that of 
positivism.  Finally, structure can also relate to how explanatory mechanisms, such as 
theory, concepts and models are used.  Consider, for example, the relationship between 
theory and concepts employed by Walker.   
 
Whilst this diversity may seem apparent and therefore unrevealing in terms of the 
concept of structure, it is suggested that by using the concept of structure it is possible to 
offer a number of critiques concerning sovereignty which would otherwise be difficult to 
achieve in terms of the particular analyses offered.  For example, the concept of structure 
enables the identification of a historical dimension in terms of how public lawyers have 
sought to address the notion of sovereignty.  This ‘historicism’ can also provides the 
basis for a comparative critique between the theorists.  Finally and possibly, most 
significantly, by focusing on the concept of structure it is possible to include alternative 
theories which are not part of current public law analysis, such as feminist critiques.  
Here sovereignty, evaluated through the concept of structure, can be seen to represent a 
command-obedience framework which can be construed as patriarchal, hierarchal and 
exclusionary in nature in terms of women’s lives.86  A further approach, currently not 
considered by public lawyers is that of Giddens theory of structuration.  Giddens argues 
that structure is a set of historically contingent and mutable rules whose origin and 
development are dependent upon agency.87  In terms of the notion of sovereignty, there is 
a connection between the internal dimension of the state and the external dimension of 
international relations.  This dualism is however, not separate but interdependent and is 
not just a product of history but also other features, such as resources and power.  It is 
suggested that Giddens analysis represents and alternative critique to MacCormick’s use 
of the institutional theory of law with its emphasis upon institutions and norms or Allan, 
Walker and Loughlin’s focus upon the relationship of the political to the legal.  Giddens 
                                                 
86  Generally see C. A. MacKinnon Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (1989); K. B. Jones 
Compassionate Authority: Democracy and the Representation of Women (1993); J. Hoffman Gender and 
Sovereignty (2001). 
87  Generally see A. Giddens The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (1984) 
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is a sociologist and the inclusion of sociological perspectives within public law is 
currently limited.88  However, by using the concept of structure such material could be 
incorporated.   
 
c.  Space 
 
A feature which dominates much of the analysis on sovereignty has been the struggle to 
accommodate the changes in the legal and political order of UK at a regional, national, 
and international level which is represented as being consequential to membership of the 
EU.  Furthermore, this breath of change is condensed into a single notion of sovereignty, 
be it MacCormick’s ‘post sovereign state’ or Walkers ‘late sovereignty’.  Public lawyers 
are in effect separating or creating ‘boundaries’ between legal and political factors from 
the geographical.89  The essence of sovereignty is territory and regions yet law and 
politics are viewed as forces which act upon these factors rather than viewing geography 
as another form of power which can act upon law and politics.  It is suggested that the 
concept of space can accommodate the shifts in knowledge that the membership of the 
EU has brought about but also widen legal analysis on a number of levels and at the same 
time facilitate the introduction of other critiques. 
 
Firstly, the concept of space can offer explanation in terms of particular places, locations, 
or as Walker states ‘polity’, be this at international level, state level or at the level of a 
community, or individual citizens, facets already acknowledged as part of legal analysis 
on sovereignty.  However, the concept of space is more ‘open textured’ in that it can go 
beyond regional or territorial confines, avoid the property relationships that Loughlin 
wishes to exclude from issues of sovereignty to include facets such as culture, ethnicity, 
gender, sexuality and even objects such as workplaces, buildings, shops, cars etc.  
Accordingly, space can accommodate a group who may relate to territory in one way, 
institutions and/or processes in another way and objects in yet a different way.  In other 
words, space can accommodate a range, depth and complexity of situations beyond that 
of law or politics or even theories such as constitutional pluralism.  
 
Secondly, space can offer an alternative explanation of techniques for control.  For 
example, political and legal techniques for control can be expressed through rules, the 
ideological and even the symbolic.  Such controls may be perceived as operating in 
respect of space, yet space can also in turn impact upon the political and the legal through 
the resources available in a particular tract of land, how a particular tract of land is used 
or viewed, its terrain and even the climate.  So whilst a nation or people may have a 
particular view of ‘sovereignty’ which will be expressed in legal and political terms, the 
                                                 
88  There are attempts to link law with sociology but the direction for such a connection is generally driven 
by sociologists rather than lawyers and occurs within the realm of jurisprudence rather than public law.  
For example see R. Banakar Merging Law and Sociology: Beyond the Dichotomies in Socio-Legal 
Research (2003).  See further R. Cotterell ‘Why Must Legal Ideas be Interpreted Sociologically’ (1998) 
25 Journal of Law and Society 171 and the response by D. Nelken ‘Blinding Insights? The Limits of a 
Reflexive Sociology of Law’ (1998) 25 Journal of Law and Society 407. 
89  Generally see N. K. Blomley Law, Space, and the Geographies of Power (1994); D. Cooper Governing 
Out of Order: Space, Law and the Politics of Belonging (1998); J. Holder and C. Harrison (eds.) Law and 
Geography  (2003).  
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spatial dimension may actually be directing how and why legal and political controls 
assume the manner and form that they do.  It could even be argued, that whilst public law 
analysis has focused upon the tension between the legal and political in terms of the 
notion of sovereignty (and hence the shift from Westphalian sovereignty and the creation 
of a number of forms of sovereignty) the real debate on sovereignty is that of the 
geographical, as expressed through resources, terrain, climate, etc factors which are 
influencing the development of the EU and the notion of sovereignty.   
 
d.  Summary 
 
Given that sovereignty is essentially a political notion, and that much of the debate within 
legal analysis has been the tension between the legal and the political dimensions and 
how to reconcile such diverse disciplines, it is suggested the method presented above, 
represents a possible solution, particularly when contrasted with the attempts to reconcile 
this tension through the use of theory.  Furthermore, by using concepts as the basis for 
examination, it has also been shown that there exits the potential to include alternative 




The aim of this paper was to examine how public lawyers use theory and concepts.  In 
respect of theory, it was argued that this represented the dominant method for the 
presentation of knowledge within public law yet little consideration is given to how such 
a form can direct, and even be directed by a theorist, in terms of the outcome of an 
analysis.  The notion of sovereignty was selected as the focus of examination having 
established that it was a phenomenon which merited consideration within public law.  
The particular theorists examined were those of Wade, Allan and MacCormick.  It was 
found that, despite focusing on a single notion, the work of the theorists were diverse and 
possibly even unconnectable.  It was not argued that this diversity was undesirable, but 
that possibly theory was not the best mechanism for the presentation of a notion as 
complex as that of sovereignty.  The notion of sovereignty was then considered as a 
concept.  Here two particular writers were considered, Walker and Loughlin.  The 
analysis offered by Walker and Loughlin were also found to be diverse, suggesting again, 
that representing sovereignty as a concept could not accommodate the diversity of 
analysis which the notion of sovereignty represented.   
 
However, as part of the examination on theory and concepts, the nature of theory and 
concepts were also considered.  It was found that although theories and concepts perform 
a similar function in respect of the presentation of knowledge, they differ in terms of the 
manner in which this knowledge is presented.  Knowledge, in terms of theory, must be 
discovered although such knowledge may be suspected, whilst for concepts, knowledge 
is pre-defined.  It was also argued there are no ‘rules’ regarding methods for the 
presentation of knowledge within public law, only entrenched practices.  Accordingly, it 
was suggested that concepts, rather than theory could form the basis for analysis in 
respect of the notion of sovereignty.  Sovereignty was then evaluated using a few key 
concepts, those of structure, ideology and space.  These concepts facilitated the inclusion 
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of all the theorists considered.  They also encapsulated much of the tensions within legal 
analysis regarding the notion of sovereignty and avoided the problems identified in 
respect of representing sovereignty as either a theory or a concept.  Furthermore, it was 
found that using concepts as the basis for analysis could widen the ability of public law to 
include alternative perspectives. 
 
Finally, it is not suggested that public lawyers should abandon theory as a method for the 
presentation knowledge.  Theory possesses great merit as a tool but its function/role 
needs to be understood and its limitations acknowledged.  Furthermore, as the domain of 
public law expands and becomes more complex it may be necessary to expand the tools 
by which knowledge is presented. 
